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LAW OR EQUITY: THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
IN A CIVIL ACTION
I.

RIGHT

To

A JuRY TRXaSL

A. The State Constitutional Guarantee
The Missouri Constitution article 1, section 22 (a) provides that "the
right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate ..1."'
The Missouri Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean that it does not
extend or contract the right to trial by jury, but preserves the right as it
existed at the time of the adoption of the constitution.2 In other words,
since each of Missouri's four constitutions have similar provisions, the
right is preserved as it existed in 1820, the date of adoption of Missouri's
first constitution.3 At common law not all civil matters were tried before a
jury. Issues in actions at law were triable by a jury as a matter of right
while issues in suits in equity were not.4 Equitable issues could, however,
be submitted to an advisory jury at the discretion of the chancellor.5 This
distinction between law and equity has been perpetuated by constitutional
provision and is today the most important remaining difference between
the two systems.6
The mandate of the constitution provides a test which is primarily
historical in that it requires the right of trial by jury to exist today as it
did at common law in 1820. One exception to the provision that suits at law
are triable by a jury as a matter of right in Missouri is the sanctioning of
the pre-existing practice of appointing a referee to determine long and
complicated factual issues in a suit at law.8 The state constitutional right
to a jury trial does not extend to newly created remedies which did not
exist at common law. This means that the legislature has authority to de1. Mo. CONST. art. II, § 28 (1875); Mo. CoNsr. art. I, § 17 (1865); and Mo.
CoNsT. art. XIII, § 8 (1820) contained similar provisions.
2. Lee v. Conran, 213 Mo. 404, 412, 111 S.W. 1151, 1153 (1908). The court
stated that the constitutional provision:
means that all the substantial incidents and consequences, which pertained
to the right of trial by jury, are beyond the reach of hostile legislation, and
are perserved in their ancient substantial extent as existed at common law.
3. In Berry v. St. Louis & S.F. R.R. Co., 223 Mo. 358, 122 S.W. 1043 (1909),
the court spoke of the date of the Constitution of 1875 as controlling. However,
1820 is the effective date because, theoretically at least, the right of trial by jury
existed in status quo from 1820 to 1875. See note 1 supra.
4. Berry v. St. Louis &cS.F. R.R. Co., supra note 3; Lee v. Conran, 213 Mo.
404, 111 S.W. 1151 (1908).
5. E.g., Adams v. Adams, 348 Mo. 1041, 156 S.W.2d 610 (1941); McCullough
v. McCullough, 31 Mo. 226 (1860).
6. Mo. Laws 1849, at 773, §§ 1 and 2 purported to abolish the distinctions
between actions at law and suits in equity. See §§ 506.040, .050, RSMo 1959.
7. James, Trial by Jury and the Federal Rules of Procedure, 45 YALE L.J.
1022, 1024-25 (1936).
8. E.g., Durwood v. Dubinsky, 291 S.W.2d 909 (Mo. 1956); Creve Coeur
Lake Ice Co. v. Tamm, 138 Mo. 385, 39 S.W. 791 (1897); Edwardson v. Garnhart,
56 Mo. 81 (1874); Shepard v. Bank of Missouri, 15 Mo. 148 (1851); see § 515.020,
RSMo 1959.
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termine if a new remedy carries with it the right to a trial by jury.9 If the
legislature fails to state how a new remedy is to be tried, it is for the courts
to apply the historical test and determine whether the remedy is of legal
or equitable cognizance. It has also been held that the legislature has the
power to provide for a jury trial in civil cases where it previously did not
exist as a constitutional right.' 0 A few states have construed their constitutions to guarantee the right of a non-jury trial in equitable matters.1" The
right to a jury trial may be waived' 2 and both the legislature and the courts
have the power to set forth reasonable regulations concerning when a jury
trial may be demanded, the form of the demand, and what constitutes
waiver.18
B. The HistoricalPatterns
Before the adoption of Missouri's first constitution in 1820 there was
no fixed line separating law and equity. Historically, each system continually borrowed from the other.' 4 As a result many matters which were
once exclusively equitable in nature became defenses to legal actions. 15
Likewise, issues which were once exclusively legal in nature became triable
in equity. 16 One such case was the situation in which the plaintiff requested
specific performance but defendant denied the existence of the contract.
Prior to merger of law and equity the parties would have been left to an
action at law, which meant that the plaintiff would first have to establish
the existence of the contract at law and if successful sue on it in equity.
9. E.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Feinberg, 357 Mo. 1044, 212 S.W.2d 574
(1948); Reliable Life Ins. Co. v. Beell, 246 S.W.2d 371 (St. L. Mo. App. 1952);
see § 76.580, RSMo 1959; cf. Nistendirk v. McGee, 225 F. Supp. 881 (W.D. Mo.
1963).

10. Berry v. St. Louis &S.F. R.R. Co., 223 Mo. 358, 122 S.W. 1043 (1909). The
defendant argued that a statute making fraud actions triable by jury was unconstitutional because it denied him his right to a non-jury trial. The court rejected this argument holding that the constitution only preserved the right to jury
trial and did not preserve any right to a non-jury trial. But see Wolfersberger v.
Hoppenjon, 334 Mo. 817, 68 S.W.2d 814 (1933) where the trial court was held in
error for trying a case before a jury because the issue of quiet title was historically
equitable in nature and defendant demanded a trial by the court without a jury.
11. Brown v. Buck, 75 Mich. 274, 42 N.W. 827 (1899); Callanan v. Judd, 23
Wis. 343 (1868).

12. E.g., State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Tighe, 386 S.W.2d 115 (Mo.
1964); Davis v. Davis, 284 S.W. 2d 575 (Mo. 1955); O'Day v. Conn, 131 Mo. 321, 32
S.W. 1109 (1895).
13. City of St. Louis v. International Harvester Co., 350 S.W.2d 782 (Mo.
En Banc 1961); § 510.190 (2), RSMo 1959.
14. VI W. HOLDSwORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 456 (1931).
15. E.g., Hubbard v. Slavens, 218 Mo. 598, 117 S.W. 1104 (1909) (estoppel);
Kitchen v. Cape Girardeau & State Line R.R. Co., 59 Mo. 514 (1875) (certain
issues of fraud); Joyce v. Murnaghan, 17 Mo. App. 11 (St. L. Ct. App. 1855) (mistake). But cf. Och v. The Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co., 130 Mo. 27, 31 S.W.
962 (1895); Homuth v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 129 Mo. 629, 31 S.W. 903 (1895)
(fraud in defense of a release). The latter two cases have, however, been legislatively
overruled so that fraud in defense of a release is triable by a jury. § 510.190 (1),
RSMo 1959. See Berry v. St. Louis & S.F. R.R. Co., 223 Mo. 358, 122 S.W. 1043
(1909) where the predecessor of § 510.190 (1) was held constitutional. See also I.
W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 456 (1931).
16. James, Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALz L.J. 655, 658 (1963).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol35/iss1/9
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Later, equity assumed jurisdiction to decide if the contract existed.1 7 The

result was a growth of law and equity characterized by overlapping and
concurrent jurisdiction. Obviously, this increased the difficulty of determining which issues were legal and which were equitable. Professor
Fleming James indicated that, because of the manner in which law and
equity developed, those issues triable by jury were determined as an automatic result of which court was the "proper forum" rather than by a consideration of which issues were best suited to jury trial.18

C. Merger of Law and Equity
In an attempt to solve the problems inherent in the burdensome
separation of law and equity,1 9 Missouri, in 1849, adopted a general code
of civil practice merging the two systems. 20 A single court using a single
system of procedure was charged with the administration of all law.2 1 One
of the immediate problems arising from the merger was the question of
when the right to trial by jury was protected by the Missouri Constitution.
The legislature attempted to solve the problem with the enactment of
legislation purporting to set forth the manner in which matters triable by
jury were to be determined. 22 In 1849 the following two statutes were
enacted:
§ 6. Whenever in an action for the recover of money only,
or of specific real or personal property, there shall be an issue of
fact, it must be tried by a jury, unless a jury trial be waived as
provided in section 1, of Article XV, or a reference be ordered as
provided in Article XVI.
§ 7. Every other issue is triable by the court, which, however,
may order the whole issue, or any specific question of fact involved
therein, to be tried by a jury; or may 23refer it as provided in the last
section, and those to which it refers.
The statutory scheme gave birth to considerable confusion because it
did not always require the same result as did the historical test of the
constitution. For instance, an action for an accounting would seem to be
triable by jury under the old statutes while the historical test would prevent
such a jury trial. 24 Many of the older cases relied, at least in part, on the
application of the statutory test.2 5 The better reasoned cases, however,
applied the historical constitutional test, holding the right of trial by jury
17.
18.
19.
20.

Denton v. Stewart, 29 Eng. Rep. 1156 (Ch. 1786).
James, supra note 16, at 661-63.
W. WAisii, EQurrY § 7 (1930).
Mo. Laws 1849, at 73, § 1. See also Morgan, Law and Equity: Pleading
Problems Resulting From Incomplete Merger, 32 Mo. L. REv. 375 (1967).
21. For the difference in law and equity pre-merger rules of procedure and
evidence see 2 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 575-77 (3d ed. 1940).
22. Missouri patterned its legislation after an early New York provision. N.Y.
Sess. Laws ch. 379, § 208 (1848).
23. Mo. Laws 1849, at 89, §§ 6, 7. These same provisions last appeared in
§§ 1099, 1100, RSMo 1939. The present section was formulated in 1943 and is now
§ 510.190 (1), RSMo 1959.
24. E.g., Ely v. Coontz, 167 Mo. 371, 67 S.W. 299 (1902).
25. E.g., Johnson v. Blell, 61 Mo. App. 37 (St. L. Ct. App. 1895).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1970
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inviolate.2 0 Finally, in 1948 the confusion was alleviated when the language
of the original jury trial statute was abandoned in favor of the present
statute which provides:
(1) The right of trial by jury as declared by the constitution
or as given by a statute shall be preserved to the parties inviolate.
In particular, any issue as to whether a release, composition, or discharge of plaintiff's original claim was fraudulently or 22otherwise
wrongfully procured shall be tried by jury unless waived.
This change in wording indicated a preference for the historical constitutional test.
D. Civil Actions Which Are Counterparts
of Former Legal Action or Equity Suits
1. Actions Legal in Nature
Following the premise that issues which were formerly legal in nature
give rise to a right to trial by jury, many cases are easily classified. Action
in tort for personal injury,28 property damage, 29 trespass,3 0 and fraud or
misrepresentation, 3 1 are legal in nature and triable by jury as a matter of
right. Likewise, on action for recovery of a debt,3 2 a suit on a note,33 and
the question of damages for breach of contract 4 are triable by jury. Actions
"on account" and "for account" are considered legal in nature as distinguished from an accounting which is equitable in nature.35 Several
actions involving disputes concerning title to land are also triable by
jury including: suits to partition,3 0 to quiet title,3 7 ejectment,38 adverse

26. E.g., Hauser v. Murray, 256 Mo. 58, 165 S.W. 376 (1914); Lee v Conran,
213 Mo. 404, 111 S.W. 1151 (1908); Hunter v. Whitehead, 42 Mo. 524 (1868). See
generally 4 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1415 (5th ed. 1941).
27. § 510.190 (1), RSMo 1959.

28. Axley v. Hammock, 185 Ark. 939, 50 S.W.2d 608 (1932).
29. New Harmony Lodge, I.O.O.F. v. Kansas City, Fort Scott & Memphis
R.R. Co., 100 Mo. App. 407, 74 S.W. 5 (St. L. Ct. App. 1903).
30. Minor v. Burton, 228 Mo. 558, 128 S.W. 964 (1910).
31. Sheldon v. Brace Motor Co., 210 S.W.2d 110 (K.G. Mo. App. 1948).
32. Buckley v. Maupin, 344 Mo. 193, 125 S.W.2d 820 (1939).
33. Stalter v. Stalter, 151 Mo. App. 66, 131 S.W. 747 (Spr. Ct. App. 1910);
Bank of Missouri v. Anderson, 1 Mo. 244 (1822).
34. E.g., Lincoln Trust Co. v. Nathan, 175 Mo. 32, 74 S.W. 1007 (1903);
Kitchen v. Cape Girardeau & State Line R.R., 59 Mo. 514 (1875); Wolf v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 219 Mo. App. 307, 269 S.W. 701 (K.C. Ct. App. 1925); Donovan
v. Barnett, 27 Mo. App. 460 (St. L. Ct. App. 1887).
35. Dahlberg v. Fisse, 328 Mo. 213, 40 S.W.2d 606 (1931).
36. Benoist v. Thomas, 121 Mo. 660, 27 S.W. 609 (1894); Hagemann v. Pinska,
225 Mo. App. 521, 37 S.W.2d 463 (St. L. Ct. App. 1931).
37. E.g., Wolfersberger v. Hoppenjon, 334 Mo. 817, 68 S.W.2d 814 (1934);
Flynn v. McNeely, 178 S.W. 69 (Mo. 1915); Hauser v. Murray, 256 Mo. 58, 165
S.W. 376 (1914); Peniston v. Hydraulic Press Brick Co., 234 Mo. 698, 138 S.W. 532
(1911).
38. Hagemann v. Pinska, 255 Mo. App. 521, 37 S.W.2d 463 (St. L. Ct. App.

1931).
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42
41
40
possession, 3 9 and accretion. Will contests and actions for replevin
are considered legal in nature and carry with them the right to trial by
jury. Actions in magistrate court, such as the statutory remedies of forcible
by jury because their counterentry and unlawful detainer, are also triable
43
parts before 1820 were legal in nature.

2. Actions Equitable in Nature
Similarly, the modem counterparts of actions which were formerly
44
recognized only in equity are not accompanied by the right to trial by
45
jury. Thus, actions involving the establishment, enforcement, 4protection,
46
a resulting trust, 7 and suits
and preservation of a trust, suits to establish
48
not raise issues for jury
do
to partition equitable estates and interests
be present even though
not
may
trial
jury
to
right
determination. The
49
the character of the relief is such that the action will be legal in nature.
This is the case when a constructive trust is enforced by an action for money
had and received 59 or damages are obtained from a trustee who is liable
52
for breach of trust. 51 Foreclosure of a deed of trust, a creditor's bill in
54
53
equity, a suit to establish a lien on real or personal property, and an
55
application for a widow's allowance are all equitable in nature.
39. Hatton v. City of St. Louis, 264 Mo. 634, 175 S.W. 888 (1915); Hubbard
v. Slavens, 218 Mo. 598, 117 S.W. 1104 (1909).
40. Withers v. Kansas City Suburban Belt R.R., 226 Mo. 373, 126 S.W. 432
(1910); Lee v. Conran, 213 Mo. 4041, 111 S.W. 1151 (1908).
41. Lamb v. Stubblefield, 186 S.W. 730 (Spr. Ct. App. 1916).
42. E.g., Walter v. Alt, 152 S.W.2d 135 (Mo. 1941); Garland v. Smith, 125 Mo.
39, 28 S.W. 191 (1894), affd, 127 Mo. 583, 29 S.W. 836 (En Banc 1895); §
473.083 (1), RSMo 1959.
43. E.g., Renshaw v. Reynolds, 317 Mo. 484, 297 S.W. 374 (1927); Sanders v.
Brooks, 238 Mo. App. 485, 183 S.W.2d 353 (K.C. Ct. App. 1944); Jackly v. Taylor,
210 Mo. App. 195, 242 S.W. 997 (St. L. Ct. App. 1922). See Mo. CONsT. art. V, §§ 19,
20; State v. Anderson, 413 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. 1967); § 513.630, RSMo 1959. But see
State ex rel. Kansas City Auditorium Co. v. Allen, 45 Mo. App. 551 (K.C. Ct. App.
1891).
44. See generally I W. HoLnswoRTH, supra note 14, at 466.
45. Except where the legislature has specifically provided for a jury trial. Berry
v. St. Louis &S.F. R.R., 223 Mo. 858, 122 S.W. 1048 (1909); § 510.190, RSMo 1959.
46. State ex rel. Clay County State Bank v. Watner, 346 Mo. 1138, 145 S.W.2d
152 (1940).
47. Shelton v. Harrison, 182 Mo. App. 404, 167 S.W. 634 (Spr. Ct. App.
1914).
48. Coffman v. Gates, 142 Mo. App. 648, 655, 121 S.W. 1078, 1079 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1909).
49. Kimberlin v. Roberts, 341 Mo. 267, 269, 107 S.W.2d 24, 26 (1937).
50. Campbell v. Webb, 363 Mo. 1192, 258 S.W.2d 595 (1953).
51. Sherwood v. Saxton, 63 Mo. 78 (1876). When, however, the prayer for
relief is to trace trust property as a definite charge upon an estate the remedy is
equitable in nature. Ibid.
52. E.g., Long v. Long, 141 Mo. 352, 44 S.W. 341 (1897). Cf. Louis v. Andrea,
338 S.W.2d 96, 105 (Mo. 1960).
53. Cape County Say. Bank v. Wilson, 225 Mo. App. 14, 34 S.W.2d 981 (St.
L. Ct. App. 1931).
54. E.g., Bronson v. Wanzer, 86 Mo. 408 (1885); Ellis &cCavender v. Kreutzinger, 31 Mo. 432 (1862); Swan v. Tabor, 266 S.W. 754 (Spr. Mo. App. 1924).
55. Bradley v. Woerner, 46 Mo. App. 371 (St. L. Ct. App. 1891).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1970
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All actions in which specific performance 56 or an injunction 57 is properly sought are equitable in nature. The same is true of actions which pray
for relief from penalties, fraud, undue influence or mistake in an action
for either rescission,58 reformation,5 9 or cancellation of an instrument.6 0
Actions involving the administration of estates, 61 suits for an accounting, 62
and suits for partnership accounting6 3 are also equitable in nature and are
not accompanied by a right to trial by jury. There is also no right to a jury
trial in a stockholders' derivative suit.64
When the civil action involves only a counterpart of a former legal
or equitable action the application of the historical test is simple. However, application becomes more difficult when both legal and equitable
issues appear in the same lawsuit.
II.

THE

EqUITABLE CLEAN-UP DOCTmNE Or

A. The HistoricalPatterns
Although purporting to apply the historical test as required by the
constitution, the Missouri courts apply the "equitable clean-up doctrine"
to determine when a right to trial by jury exists. Briefly stated equitable
clean-up is the concept that if a ground for equitable relief exists, equity
will retain jurisdiction to decide all issues of controversy between the
parties to the suit, including the purely legal issues involved. 65 Prior to
the merger of law and equity, there were at least three areas where application of the clean-up doctrine was important: 66 (1) a plaintiff entitled to
both legal and equitable relief needed the opportunity to have one action
settle both claims and thus save the time and expense involved in presenting the claims in two separate actions; 67 (2) a plaintiff who had sought
equitable relief in good faith but had been unsuccessful needed relief from
the running, at law, of the statute of limitations, and (3) a plaintiff who
made a wrong choice of forum needed relief from the undue expense and
56. E.g., Ragsdale v. Achuff, 324 Mo. 1159, 27 S.W.2d 6 (1930); Spague v.
Carroll, 188 S.W. 63 (Mo. 1916); McCullough v. McCullough, 31 Mo. 226 (1860).
57. State ex rel. Burns v. Shain, 297 Mo. 369, 248 S.W. 591 (En Banc 1923);
Eckhardt v. Bock, 159 S.W.2d 395 (St. L. Mo. App. 1942).
58. Shearer v. Farmers' Life Ins. Co., 262 F. 861 (8th Cir. 1919).
59. Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 102 F.2d 16 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
307 U.S. 638 (1939).
60. Seested v. Dickey, 318 Mo. 192, 300 S.W. 1088 (1927); Weil v. Kume, 49
Mo. 158 (1871); Bray v. Thatcher, 28 Mo. 129 (1859).
61. Stevens v. Larwill, 110 Mo. App. 140, 84 S.W. 113 (K.C. Ct. App. 1904);
Pearson v. Haydel, 87 Mo. App. 495 (St. L. Ct. App. 1901).
62. E.g., Johnson v. Blell, 61 Mo. App. 37 (St. L. Ct. App. 1894). See also
4 J. POMEROY, supra note 26.
63. E.g., Ely v. Coontz, 167 Mo. 371, 67 S.W. 299 (1902); Hunter v. Whitehead, 42 Mo. 524 (1868).
64. Malasky v. Lapin, 396 S.W.2d 761 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965).
65. 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 71 (5th ed. 1849).
See Crenshaw v. Looker, 185 Mo. 375, 84 S.W. 885 (1904).
66. Levin, Equitable Clean-Up and the Jury: A Suggested Orientation, 100
U. PA. L. REv. 320 (1951).
67. I J. STORY, supra note 65, at § 456.
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delay of refiling his action at law.68 Because of these needs equity expanded
its jurisdiction 69 to include the power to grant damages and other legal relief incidental to some substantial equitable right.7o
Equitable clean-up was not universally applied. It had strict limitations and was exercised only when in the discretion of the chancellor it
was proper to do so.71 One element which weighed heavily against the
decision to exercise the jurisdiction conferred by the dean-up doctrine was
the absence of a right to a jury trial in the courts of equity. 72 justice Story
felt that the jury determination of an issue of damages was of such importance that in the proper case equity would refuse to exercise its jurisdiction
73
and leave the parties to their remedy at law.

B. PresentMissouri Law
1. The Need for the Doctrine
The reasons for application of equitable clean-up were arguably eliminated by the merger of law and equity, since the new rules concerning
joinder of claims and causes of action have removed the need for multiple
actions. 74 Liberal rules of amending the petition prevent the need to dismiss upon denial of the equitable relief. Today, simply by transferring the
action to the jury docket the statute of limitations problem is avoided.
Furthermore, since total jurisdiction has been conferred on a single court,
it is unnecessary to consider the law and equity sides of the court as separate.
Thus, the only reason the ancient differences in law and equity jurisdiction
should be examined is to determine when the historical test requires a
jury trial.
Modern application of the dean-up doctrine has very limited justification. Professor Levin suggests only three instances in which it should be
used: 75 (1) the situation where the plaintiff comes into equity for specific
relief and thereafter the defendant's conduct renders such relief improper;7 6
(2) the situation where the plaintiff seeks specific relief in equity in good
faith only to learn that some prior action of the defendant has rendered
equitable relief improper;7 7 and (3) the situation where the plaintiff sues
for specific relief and is not entitled to such because of his own impropriety
in dealing with the defendant. The harm in denying equity jurisdiction in
68. See Waddle v. Frazier, 245 Mo. 391, 151 S.W. 87 (1912); Grinnell Co. v.

Farm & Home Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 75 S.W.2d 409 (Spr. Mo. App. 1934).
69. Originally equity did not have jurisdiction to grant damages of any nature.
E. FRY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS § 764 (2d ed. 1871).
70. I J. STORY, supra note 65, at § 71. Justice Story indicates that the principle
that once equity jurisdiction attaches the court can grant complete relief evolved,
in part at least, from the use of equitable discovery.
71. 1 J. STORY, supra note 65, at §§ 71, 72.
72. 2 A. FREEMAN, LA.W OF JUDGMENTS 1252, 1360-62 (5th ed. 1925).
73. I J. STORY, supra note 65, at § 90. See Thias v. Siener, 103 Mo. 814, 15
S.W. 772 (1890).
74. § 509.060, RSMo 1959.
75. Levin, supra note 66, at 335.
76. Greenaway v. Adams, 12 Ves. Jr. 395, 33 Eng. Rep. 149 (Ch. 1806). See

Pittman v. Faron, 315 S.W.2d 836 (St. L. Mo. App. 1958).
77. Lee v. Howe, 27 Mo. 521 (1858).
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this latter situation is that to do so would leave the plaintiff to a jury at
law. In such a situation a jury may reduce the damages because of the
plaintiff's sharp practice. 78 But even in these three situations the problems
involved can be avoided without applying the clean-up doctrine. The defendant's conduct subsequent to the filing of the petition can still either
be enjoined or be remedied by an award of increased damages. Should the
plaintiff mistake his remedy, liberal allowance of amendment will avoid
any harm. When the plaintiff is denied equitable relief because of his
misconduct it would seem that his demand for relief would require the
rigid scrutiny of a jury.
2. Use of the Doctrine to Deny the Right to Trial by Jury
The Missouri courts have applied the doctrine of equitable clean-up in
deciding when the right to a jury trial exists in three situations involving
both legal and equitable claims: (1) the situation where the plaintiff presents both an equitable and a legal claim in the same action; 79 (2) the
situation where the plaintiff presents a legal claim and the defendant presents an equitable defense; 80 and (3) the situation where the plaintiff
81
presents an equitable claim and the defendant asserts a legal counterclaim.
In all three situations the courts have stated that since prior to the merger
of law and equity the clean-up doctrine would have drawn the entire controversy into equity, no right to trial by jury now exists.
The remainder of this comment will examine the right to a jury trial
in a civil action in terms of what the historical patterns were, what the

present stage of development of Missouri law is, and what changes, if any,
are needed in order to comply with the constitutional requirement. The
following four categories82 of civil actions will be examined in detail: (1)
actions in which the plaintiff injects both legal and equitable claims; (2)
actions in which the plaintiff presents a legal claim and the defendant sets

up an equitable defense; (3)actions in which the plaintiff presents an
equitable claim and the defendant a legal counterclaim; (4) actions for
declaratory judgment.
III. CIVIL

ACTIONS IN WHICH PLAINTIFF INJECTS

BOTH LEGAL AND EQUITABLE CLAIMS

A. HistoricalPatterns
Many situations arose in which both legal and equitable relief were
necessary to render full and complete relief to the plaintiff. There were
four basic patterns present at common law: (1) the situation in which the
plaintiff had to obtain equitable relief prior to obtaining legal relief; (2)
the situation in which legal relief had to be obtained prior to obtaining
equitable relief; (3) those situations in which the plaintiff had a limited
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
Trial in

See Hanson v. Neal, 215 Mo. 256, 114 S.W. 1073 (1908).
Sebree v. Rosen, 374 S.W.2d 132 (Mo. 1964).
Martin v. Turnbaugh, 153 Mo. 172, 54 S.W. 515 (1899).
McKinley v. Durbin, 231 S.W.2d 286 (St. L. Mo. App. 1950).
These categories are patterned after those found in James, Right to a Jury
Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655 (1963).
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choice between a legal and an equitable remedy; and (4) those situations
in which the plaintiff could, to some extent, control the issues to be determined by the jury.
I. Equitable Relief First
Prior to the merger of law and equity, if the plaintiff desired both
legal and equitablb relief he was often required to seek the equitable relief
first. For example, suppose X claimed that a written contract with Y was
incorrct as written and that Y had breached the real agreement which did
not appear on the face of the writing.8 3 In such a case X would first have
had to go into equity and seek a decree of reformation so that the written
instrument would represent the real terms of the agreement. If the
chancellor found that X was entitled to equitable relief, reformation would
be granted along with other incidental relief to which X was entitled, including the legal relief of damages for breach of contract (equitable cleanup).8 4 Also, had Y first instituted suit at law on the written contract X
could have obtained an injunction abating this action until determination
of the issue of equitable reformation.8 5 In both situations neither party
would have a choice as to the mode of trial, because the equitable issues
would have to be determined first, without the presence of a jury.8 6 As will
be seen however, the favored view as to the clean-up doctrine was that it
would not require the plaintiff to seek his incidental legal relief in the
87
action in equity.

Suppose, however, that X had sought only reformation in the court of
equity. After equity had decreed such reformation X could then sue at law
for damages. Issues of fact which were necessarily determined in the equity
proceeding would not carry the right to a jury trial in the later action
because the doctrine of collateral estoppel would bind the parties as to
such issues determined.8 8 But as to the fact issues not previously determined
either party could demand a trial by jury. In this example, such fact issues
not determined would include the issues of breach of the reformed contract
and damages. Thus, the plaintiff by presenting his claims in this manner
could exercise some control over whether any issues were to be determined
by a jury.
2. Legal Relief First
In the second pre-merger situation, the plaintiff desired both legal and
equitable relief but equity refused relief until a preliminary legal issue
could be determined. An example of this situation would be a suit to enjoin a trespass in which the legal title to the land had been disputed. Be83. E.g., Smith v. Githens, 271 S.W.2d 374 (Spr. Mo. App. 1954); accord, Kelly
v. Hurt, 61 Mo. 463 (1875).
84. James, supra note 82, at 670; 'accord, Goldman v. Ashbrook, 262 S.W.2d
165, 168 (K.C. Mo. App. 1953).
85. Enlow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379 (1935); 1 J. PomERoY,
EQurrY JumisPauDNcE 370, 371, 375 (5th ed. 1941).
86. Ibid.
87. See notes 99 and 100 infra.
88. McCoid, Right to Juy Trial in the Federal Courts, 45 IowA L. REv. 726
(1960); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (1942).
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cause equity refused to try issues of legal title to land,8 9 the plaintiff had to
proceed at law and either party could demand a jury trial. If the plaintiff
won he could then present a petition in equity to restrain the defendant
from interfering with the land.9 0 In the subsequent equity suit the principle
of collateral estoppel would bind the parties to the extent that the prior
action at law had determined the issues. 91
3. Election of Remedy
The third situation gave the plaintiff a limited choice between a
legal remedy and an equitable remedy. The typical case involved a breach
of contract for the sale of realty in which the purchaser could sue for
specific performance or for damages.9 2 In such a situation plaintiff's election of remedy would govern the mode of trial. If he desired to have a
jury trial he would choose the legal remedy of damages. If he wanted to
avoid a jury trial he would choose the equitable remedy of specific performance.
4. Plaintiff Controls the Issues
The first three situations did not represent the majority of pre-merger
cases. Usually, the plaintiff had a great deal of control over whether a jury
would determine the issues common to his legal and equitable claims. The
plaintiff's power to control the issues triable by jury was aptly described
as follows:
On the one hand, he might have filed a bill in equity for injunctive relief with an additional prayer for incidental damages
which equity had power to award under the cleanup doctrine.
Under this procedure neither party had a right to jury trial on any
fact issue. Or he might first have filed a bill in equity for injunctive relief and later sued at law for damages. Arguably this was
splitting a cause of action since he could have gotten damages in
the equity proceeding; but assuming the availability of this option,
it appears that plaintiff could limit jury trial to the damage issue
alone. Principles of collateral estoppel would make the equity
court's determination of such facts . . . binding in the later law
action, to the extent that they were necessarily decided by the
equity decree. Conversely, plaintiff might sue first at law for
damages and later proceed in equity for injunctive relief. Here
principles of collateral estoppel would make the jury's determinations binding on the court in the later equity proceeding. Thus
plaintiff could completely avoid jury trial, block it except for the
damage issue, or guarantee it on all issues except right to an injunction.93

89. E.g., Freer v. Davis, 52 W. Va. 1, 43 S.E. 164 (1903); New Castle v. Raney,
130 Pa. 546, 18 A. 1066 (1890). See also Goldman v. Ashbrook, 262 S.W.2d 165 (K.C.
Mo. App. 1953).
90. James, supra note 82, at 671.
91. McCoid, supra note 88, at 729; W. WALSH, EQurY § 16 (1930).
92. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 59 Mo. 232 (1875); accord, Holland v. Anderson,
38 Mo. 55 (1866).
93, McCoid, supra note 88, at 729-30.
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These same principles applied to situations where plaintiff needed both
an injunction and damages, 94 or where he needed both specific performance and damages, 95 in order to have complete relief.
5. Did the Clean-Up Doctrine Cause the Rules of
Res Judicata to Apply?
Two periods in the history of equity jurisdiction must be examined
with regard to the plaintiff's ability to present his equitable and legal issues
in separate actions: (1) original or classical equity and (2) equity as it
existed just prior to merger. In classical equity the chancellor refused to
entertain any legal issues, including damages; 96 hence the plaintiff could
have presented his legal and equitable claims in different suits and the
doctrine of res judicata would not have barred the second suit. In the more
recent situation, however, a question arose as to whether the jurisdiction
obtained by reason of the equitable dean-up doctrine was such as to
cause the application of the rules of res judicata. 97 Specifically, if the plaintiff first proceeded in equity where he could have presented his legal
claim by reason of the clean-up doctrine, would his failure to present the
legal claim bar a subsequent action at law for damages? The authorities
were split on this issue.98 One line of cases reasoned that if no claim for
damages was made in the equity action and damages were not mentioned
in the chancellor's decree, the right to damages had not been adjudicated
and could be asserted in a subsequent action at law.9 9 Under this view, the
jurisdiction obtained by the clean-up doctrine did not require the application of the rules of res judicata, i.e., the jurisdiction was considered discretionary. A second line of cases adopted the view that since the petition
in equity could have included a claim for incidental legal relief under the
clean-up rule, the plaintiff had a duty to present all claims in a single
equity action.100 Under this view the clean-up doctrine conferred mandatory, rather than discretionary, jurisdiction and the rules of res judicata
applied. This view, however, was criticized because it results ii a denial
of trial by jury on the legal issues presented.
In the case of a complete denial of equitable relief there is
ordinarily either no jurisdiction to grant legal relief at all or the
court is not bound to retain jurisdiction for that purpose ....

For

94. Sapp v. Garrett, 284 S.W.2d 49 (K.C. Mo. App. 1955).
95. Dyer v. Union Elec. Co., 318 S.W.2d 401 (Spr. Mo. App. 1958).
96. E. FRY, SPECIFIC PEPORMAI4CE OF CoNr.Acrs, supra note 69.
97. II A. FREEMAN, supra note 72, at § 593.
98. Ibid.

99. E.g., Hofstetter v. Myers Const., Inc., 170 Kan. 464, 227 P.2d 115 (1951);
Chanute Brick &cTile Co. v. Gas Belt Fuel Co., 89 Kan. 177, 130 P. 649 (1913);
Hampton v. Cope, 144 Ky. 720, 139 S.W. 937 (1911); Piro v. Shipley, 33 Pa. Super.
278 (1907); Perdue v. Ward, 88 W. Va. 371, 106 S.E. 874 (1921). See Annot., 26
A.L.R.2d 446 (1952).
100. E.g., Walzl v. King, 113 Md. 550, 77 A. 1117 (1910); Gilbert v. Boak Fish
Co., 86 Minn. 365, 90 N.W. 767 (1902); Interlied v. Whaley, 32 N.Y.S. 640 (1895);
Coulter v. Davis, 81 Tenn. (13 Lea) 451 (1884). See also Prothero v. Phelps, 25
L.R. 105 (ch 1855).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1970

11

Missouri
Law Review,LAW
Vol. 35,REVIEW
Iss. 1 [1970], Art. 9
MISSOURI

[Vol. 35

this reason unless it appears that the question of legal relief has
actually been litigated, the judgment is not a bar. 0 1
It is submitted that the preferred view was that a prior equity decree was
not a bar to the subsequent action at law on a separate claim, thus making
the jurisdiction obtained by the clean-up doctrine discretionary.' 0 2
The rules of res judicata did not apply when the plaintiff proceeded
first at law and then in equity.' 0 3 Because there was no rule at law comparable to the doctrine of equitable clean-up, the plaintiff had no duty to
present his equitable claim along with his legal claim for relief. 104 The
same results occurred both in equity just prior to merger and in classical
equity. Notwithstanding the existence of the clean-up doctrine the plaintiff was able to proceed in either court without the law action being a bar
to a later suit in equity. 0 5
B. Present Missouri Law
1. Equitable Relief First
Since the merger of law and equity, the application of the historical
test to situations involving both legal and equitable relief presents some
very perplexing problems concerning the order of trial and the existence
of the right to trial by jury. Where the equitable issue must be decided
before the legal issue, application of the historical test requires that the
equitable issue be tried first by the court and then, if either party demands
it, the legal issue should be tried before a jury. However, many Missouri
cases have taken the position that the clean-up doctrine is mandatory and
that once the court takes such a case it has jurisdiction to determine the
legal factual issues without a jury. Sebree v. Rosen' 0 6 involved a suit to
cancel a forgiveness of a debt because of fraud and for a legal judgment
on the notes. The equitable decision on cancellation of the forgiveness
had to be made prior to any determination of recovery on the notes. The
Missouri Supreme Court stated in dictum that
[a] suit on a promissory note is ordinarily an action at law,
but where, as here, a court of equity once acquires jurisdiction, it
can retain jurisdiction to do full and complete justice even though
the additional relief involves adjudicating matters of law and
rendering a money judgment.O 7
The danger in reciting this classic rule unnecessarily is that it may be
used to deny the parties valid opportunity to have a jury try the legal issue
involved. Under the favored view,' 0 8 the equitable clean-up doctrine was

101. II A. FREEMAN, supra note 72, at 1252.

102. I J. STORY, supra note 65, at §§ 71, 72.
103. See Tipping v. St. Helen's Smelting Co., L.R. 1 Ch. 66 (1865); St. Helen's
Smelting Co. v. Tipping, 642 11 Eng. Rep. 1483 (1865).
104. II A. FmEmaA, supra note 72, at §§ 643, 644, 647.
105. Givens v. Peake, 31 Ky. 225 (1833).
106. 374 S.W.2d 132 (Mo. 1964). See also Kelly v. Hurt, 61 Mo. 463 (1875).
107. See Sebree v. Rosen, 374 S.W.2d 132, 138 (Mo. 1964).
108. II A. Famri.N, supra note 72, at § 593.
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not considered mandatory in this situation and the chancellor would take
jurisdiction over legal matters only when the plaintiff prayed for the additional relief in equity.109 Since merger, however, the plaintiff is compelled
to request in one civil action all the relief he desires concerning a single
transaction.'1 0 The point is that equitable dean-up should not be applied
when the plaintiff demands a jury trial of legal issues which have not been
determined by the adjudication of the equitable issues. To do so would
deny plaintiff his constitutional right to trial by jury. This is because under
the favored historical view the plaintiff had an option of combining his
claims into one action in equity or separating his actions into an equity
suit and a legal action in which collateral estoppel"' would bind some
issues and leave others triable by a jury.
2. Legal Relief First
There have also been Missouri cases since merger where the situation
required both legal and equitable relief, but where equity was forced to
refuse relief until the legal issue had been determined."12 In this type of
situation, the trial judge should see that the legal issue is determined before the equitable issue. Historically, the equitable clean-up doctrine was
never applied to this situation because the plaintiff would have presented
his legal claim at law before instituting the equity action. However, the
Missouri courts have applied the equitable clean-up doctrine to deny trial
by jury. In Goldman v. Ashbrook11 3 plaintiff brought suit for money lent
to the defendant for the purpose of remodeling defendant's home. Plaintiff
also prayed for both specific performance of an agreement in which defendant agreed to subject her home to a lien for the loan and for an injunction restraining defendant from disposing of the home. Historically,
legal issues of the amount and incurring of the debt would have been determined at law, and then the plaintiff would have had to go into equity
to establish the lien."14 The defendant's demand for a jury trial however,
was denied. On appeal, the Kansas City Court of Appeals affirmed the
denial stating:
109. I J. STORY, supra note 65, at § 71. Justice Story interpreted the rule of
equity jurisdiction over legal issues as discretionary rather than mandatory. He
stated that the rule is that the equity court may retain jurisdiction over the legal
issues if the plaintiff prays for it to do so.
110. Williams v. City of Hayti, 184 S.W. 470 (Mo. 1916); Dunn v. Pickard,
284 S.W.2d 6 (K.C. Mo. App. 1955). See generally Krummenacher v. Western Auto
Supply Co., 358 Mo. 757, 217 S.W.2d 473 (En Banc 1949); Goldman v. Ashbrook,
262 S.W.2d 165 (K.C. Mo. App. 1953); § 509.060, RSMo 1959.
111. Austin v. Brooklyn Cooperage Co., 285 S.W. 1015, 1016 (Spr. Mo. App.
1926). See also McCoid, supra note 88, at 730.
112. Wynn v. Cory, 43 Mo. 301 (1869). In this case the plaintiff sued for
ejectment, damages and for cancellation of a quitclaim deed from a third party to
the defendant. The trial court proceeded to try the case as one in equity but first
submitted the issues of title to the land and damages to the jury which found for
plaintiff on both. The supreme court reversed stating that the equitable and legal
claims were improperly joined. This decision is dearly erroneous since the merger
of law and equity occurred in Missouri in 1849, but the importance of the case lies
in the mode of trial at the lower level.
113. 262 S.W.2d 165 (K.C. Mo. App. 1953).
114. Cases cited note 54 supra.
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It would appear clear to the trial court in the instant case
that if the plaintiff should be entitled, in his equitable action as
p leaded, to a judgment for the money loaned and an equitable
lien on certain real estate of defendant to secure the same, that a
mere judgment in his action at law for the money loaned would
not afford the plaintiff complete and adequate relief. In fact there
is no action at law conceivable, that would adjudge in the plaintiff
an equitable lien on real estate.... The equity jurisdiction of the
court having attached under the pleadings and the proof, the court
was authorized to dispose of both the legal and equitable aspects
of the controversy and to do full and complete justice therein."15
The power to do "full and complete justice" was, however, discretionary
in the court of equity and such discretion was never exercised in such a
way as to harm either plaintiff or defendant. It is in this respect that the
Goldman case departs from the pre-merger treatment in denying defendant
her constitutional right to a jury trial.11 6 The case also applies the clean-up
doctrine in a situation where historically it would not have been applicable.
In Goldman a jury should have been called to hear all the evidence pertaining to the legal issues of the making of the loan and the amount of the
debt. Evidence on both the legal and the equitable issues could have been
taken at the same time, unless there was evidence on the equitable issue
which might have unduly influenced or confused the jury in which case
such evidence could be taken outside the jury's presence. The jury would
determine the legal issues first and, then, if necessary, the court would determine the equitable issues of fact not resolved by the jury's determination."17
3. Election of Remedy
Confusion has resulted in the situation where the plaintiff has a choice
of either legal or equitable relief, but not both. In Hamilton v. Hamilton," 5s decided in 1875, plaintiff sued for specific performance of an oral
contract to convey realty and for such other decree as the court might
deem just. The trial court construed the situation as one in which plaintiff
had the right to either equitable relief or legal damages, but not both.
Apparently the remedy of damages was elected because a jury was called
which awarded damages to plaintiff. Defendant appealed claiming that
the submission of the case to a jury was improper. The supreme court
affirmed the lower court's decision indicating that the jury was an "advisory jury" convened within the discretion of the chancellor, not a constitutional jury."O Clearly, the Hamilton opinion was erroneous in its assumption that equity jurisdiction could be retained even though the
plaintiff was not entitled to equitable relief. The proper rule, as stated in
Krummenacher v. Western Auto Supply Co.,1 20 decided in 1949, is that
115. Goldman v. Ashbrook, 262 S.W.2d 165, 168 (K.C. Mo. App. 1953).
116. Lee v. Conran, 213 Mo. 404, 111 S.W. 1151 (1908).
117. Wynn v. Cory, 43 Mo. 301 (1869).
118. 59 Mo. 232 (1875).
119. Id. at 234.
120. 358 Mo. 757, 761, 217 S.W.2d 473, 475 (En Banc 1949); see Chicago, R.I.
&P. Ry. Co. v. State Highway Comm'n. of Missouri, 322 Mo. 419, 17 S.W.2d 535
(1929). See also Yellow Mfg. Acceptance Corp. v. American Taxicabs, 344 Mo. 1200,
1219, 130 S.W.2d 601, 610 (1939).
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a court of equity does not have jurisdiction to render a judgment
for a plaintiff on legal issues in the absence of a finding that some
equitable right of plaintiff has also been violated.
Confusion however has resulted from the misapplication of the doctrine
that once equity obtains jurisdiction it can retain it to do full and complete
justice, including the determination of legal remedies.' 21 By adopting the
view that the application of this doctrine is mandatory, rather than discretionary, Missouri courts have extended the doctrine beyond its intended
122
area of concern.
4. Plaintiff Controls the Issues
The more common situation in which the plaintiff seeks both equitable and legal relief is a suit for specific performance of a contract plus
damages resulting from the lack of timely performance 123 or a suit for
abatement of a nuisance along with damages for past injuries to the plaintiff's property. 2 4 In such situations, prior to merger, the plaintiff had a
choice of presenting his claims in both courts in any order he desired. In
Hudson v. Burk 25 plaintiff sued to restrain defendant from rebuilding a
levee which, prior to the destruction of the embankment, had obstructed
plaintiff's normal watercourse for two years. Plaintiff also sued to recover
damages caused by the embankment's interference with the water flow.
Defendant claimed he had only impounded the surface water. The issue was
tried before a jury which found for plaintiff and awarded him damages.
The question on appeal was whether the amount of damages was improper.
However, the St. Louis Court of Appeals expressly approved the mode of
trial, stating:
The court and the litigants proceeded, and we think correctly,
to try the case as an action at law. All issues necessary to the defendant's liability were submitted to the jury under instructions,
and upon the verdict the court entered a judgment, and in addition to this he [defendant] was ordered to abate the nuisance. 20
'The result in Hudson v. Burk was correct in that it followed the historical
test required by the Missouri Constitution.12 7 It also illustrated how the
merger of law and equity rendered the application of the clean-up doctrine
unnecessary. Since plaintiff could separate his legal and equitable claims
prior to merger, he should be given that same option today by allowing
121. E.g., Godwin v. Graham, 360 Mo. 418, 228 S.W.2d 789 (1950); Merz v.

Tower Grove Bank & Trust Co., 844 Mo. 1150, 1168, 130 S.W.2d 611, 621 (1939).

122. Waddle v. Frazier, 245 Mo. 391, 151 S.W. 87 (1912). See Grinnell Co. v.
Farm & Home Say. & Loan Ass'n, 75 S.W.2d 409 (Spr. Mo. App. 1934). Compare
Paris v. Haley, 61 Mo. 453 (1875) with Supreme Lodge, K.P. v. Dazell, 205 Mo. App.
207, 223 S.W. 786 (St. L. Ct. App. 1920).
123. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 59 Mo. 232 (1875); Dyer v. Union Elec. Co., 318
S.W.2d 401 (Spr. Mo. App. 1958).
124. Sapp v. Garratt, 284 S.W.2d 49 (K.C. Mo. App. 1955); Hudson v. Burk,
48 Mo. App. 314 (St. L. Ct. App. 1892).
125. 48 Mo. App. 314 (St. L. Ct. App. 1892).
126. Id. at 316.
127. Grayson v. Weddle, 80 Mo. 39 (1883).
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him to demand a jury trial on the legal issues presented in his claim for
damages.
5. Misapplication of The Clean-Up Doctrine
The Missouri courts are likely to apply the clean-up doctrine so as to
deny a right to trial by jury, in the situation where both legal and equitable claims are joined by the plaintiff. However, there are at least four
reasons why it is improper for the courts to apply the doctrine in this
manner: (1) primarily application of the clean-up doctrine disregards the
constitutional mandate regarding the right to a jury trial; (2) the reasons
for applying the clean-up doctrine were removed by the merger of law and
equity; (3) if the clean-up doctrine is to be applied at all, it is discretionary
in nature and should never be applied to deny the substantive rights of
either party;1 28 and (4) application of the clean-up doctrine thwarts the
purpose of the rules of permissive joinder since plaintiffs who are not required to join their legal and equitable claims will not do so if they desire
a jury trial.
IV. CIVIL ACTIONS

IN WHICH PLAINTIFF PRESENTS A LEGAL CLAIM
AND DEFENDANT SETS Up AN EQUITABLE DEFENSE

A. HistoricalPatterns
Prior to merger a plaintiff could institute an action at law against a
defendant who had a defense in equity. For example, assume the plaintiff
sued at law to recover rent due under a lease agreement which remained
binding even though the leased building had been destroyed by fire.12 9
Also assume that the plaintiff had breached a covenant to rebuild, creating
a proper basis for rescission of the contract. Equity would have enjoined the
law action until the issue of rescission was determined. 130 If the chancellor
decided the issue of rescission in favor of the law defendant (the equity
plaintiff) he would have granted rescission and a permanent injunction
against the law action.' 3' If the issue of rescission were decided against the
law defendant, the temporary injunction would have been dissolved and
the plaintiff at law would proceed with the action for rent due. The findings in the equity action were binding at law by reason of collateral
estoppel. 13 2 Accordingly, there was no right to a jury trial on any issue if
the law defendant's action in equity prevailed. If it failed, however, there
was a jury trial of all issues except those necessarily determined in the suit
in equity.
In one situation existing in pre-merger equity the equitable clean-up
doctrine could have been applied. Suppose the plaintiff sued at law for
damages for breach of contract and the defendant presented a bill in equity
to reform the contract. In such a case the law action would have been tem128. II H. BLACK, JUDGMENTS §§ 517, 518 (2d ed. 1902); McCoid, supra note 88.
129. Lincoln Trust Co. v. Nathan, 175 Mo. 32, 74 S.W. 1007 (1903).
130. James, supra note 82, at 679.
131. It must be noted here that the equitable clean-up doctrine never applied
to the legal claim for it was properly instituted at law.
132. McCoid, supra note 88, at 738. Professor McCoid indicates that this was
so only if the law plaintiff pleaded the result in equity to bind the defendant to
the equity finding of facts.
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porarily enjoined. If the law defendant prevailed in equity and the contract
was reformed and, as reformed, it was breached by the law plaintiff, the
equity plaintiff (the law defendant) could have petitioned the chancellor
to exercise his clean-up jurisdiction by awarding damages incidental to
the reformation of the contract. In this situation the chancellor might settle
183
the entire dispute in one action to avoid unnecessary delay and expense.
However, under the view that the application of the clean-up doctrine was
discretionary, the chancellor weighed the cost of delay and expense to the
equity plaintiff in denying jurisdiction against the value to the equity defendant of his opportunity for a jury trial on the issue of damages.
B.

Present Missouri Law

1. Equitable Defenses and Counterclaims
There is a need to distinguish between "equitable defenses" and "equitable counterclaims" in order to fully appreciate the position of the
Missouri courts.' 3

4

Before merger, many formerly equitable defenses such

as estoppel, 3 5 fraud, 36 and mistake' 3 7 had appeared in the law
court.13 8 Many courts labeled such matters as equitable defenses and
attached the name of equitable counterclaim only to those matters requiring a separate suit in equity. The meaning of equitable defense as used
in this article is of the latter type and has the characteristic of completely
destroying the plaintiff's claim at law if accepted. 39 Rather than allow
labels to control, one must examine whether the equitable matter would
completely destroy the plaintiff's claim 1 40 and if the matter would have
4
required a separate action in equity prior to merger.' '
2. Application of the Historical Approach
Since merger Missouri courts have followed the same pattern as that prevailing under the dual system of law and equity. When the plaintiff presents a legal claim and the defendant pleads matter which would have
133. Levin, Equitable Clean-Up and the Jury: A Suggested Orientation, 100
U. PA. L. REv. 320 (1951).
134. Professor James criticizes this distinction in James, Right to Jury Trial in
Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 680 (1963), but the discussion throws light on the

Missouri cases in this area. See State ex rel. American Cent. Ins. Co. v. Reynolds,
289 Mo. 382, 232 S.W. 683 (1921).
135. Citizens Trust Co. v. Going, 288 Mo. 505, 232 S.W. 996 (1921); Withers v.
Kansas City Suburban Belt R.R., 226 Mo. 373, 126 S.W. 432 (1910); Hubbard v.
Slavens, 218 Mo. 598, 117 S.W. 1104 (1909).
136. E.g., Schuermann v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 165 Mo. 641, 65 S.W. 723
(1901); Earl v. Hart, 89 Mo. 263, 1 S.W. 238 (1886); Kitchen v. Cape Girardeau &
State Line R.R., 59 Mo. 514 (1875); Routt v. Milner, 57 Mo. App. 50 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1894).
137. Joyce v. Murnaghan, 17 Mo. App. 11 (St. L. Ct. App. 1885).
188. The equitable defense of laches never appeared at law. There was no
need for it to operate at law because of the various statutes of limitations applicable. Hecker v. Bleish, 319 Mo. 149, 3 S.W.2d 1008 (1928).
139. State ex rel. American Cent. Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 289 Mo. 382, 232 S.W.
683 (1921).
140. Hauser v. Murray, 256 Mo. 58, 165 S.W. 376 (1914).

141. Citizen's Trust Co. v. Going, 288 Mo. 505, 232 S.W. 996 (1921).
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formerly established a separate suit in equity and which, if true, would
completely destroy the plaintiff's cause of action, the equitable issues are
tried first by the court without a jury. 142 It does not matter whether equity
is raised as a defense or as a counterclaim so long as the equitable matter
would defeat the plaintiff's right to recovery.143 If the equitable issue is
144
determined in favor of the defendant there is no jury trial of any issue.
If the equitable issue fails both parties have the right to a jury trial on the
remaining legal issues. 145 If, however, the defendant admits the plaintiff's
legal claim and loses on the determination of the equitable issue, there is
46
no longer a factual controversy and no right to a jury trial remains.1 It
is clear that the plaintiff would be entitled to counter the defendant's
147
equitable defense with any claim which might defeat it.
It must be remembered that when the defense pleaded is a matter
which was formerly for purely equitable determination the equitable issues
must be tried first without a jury. 48 However, when the defense is one
which was available at either law or equity there should be a jury trial of
the issues. In Babcock v. Rieger, 4 9 the Missouri Supreme Court followed
this view. There the plaintiff sued for damages for breach of contract, and
the defendant pleaded failure of consideration and prayed for cancellation
of the contract. The defendant moved to transfer the case from law to
equity thus denying plaintiff a jury trial. The trial court sustained the
motion, but the supreme court reversed stating:
It is not disputed that, if the defendant, in a suit wherein the
petition states a cause of action at law, sets up an equitable defense
which entitles him to affirmative relief and prays for such relief,
the whole case is converted into a suit in equity. Neither can it
be doubted that the cancellation of instruments ... is a matter of
equitable cognizance. But a prayer for affirmative equitable relief
amounts to nothing unless the facts alleged authorize such relief.
As a general rule, where suit has been brought upon a written
instrument setting up a purely legal demand and wherein the defendant has a complete and adequate remedy by way of defense
available in the legal action, a court of equity will not take jurisdiction of the cause and deprive the plaintiff of his right to a jury
trial.15 0
Thus, where the defense of failure of consideration presents an adequate
remedy at law the defendant cannot defeat the plaintiff's right to a jury
142. Burnett v. Johnson, 349 S.W.2d 19 (Mo. 1961); Dahlberg v. Fisse, 328
Mo. 213, 40 S.W.2d 606 (1931); Keltner v. Threlkel, 316 Mo. 609, 291 S.W. 462
(1927); Withers v. Kansas City Suburban Belt R.R., 226 Mo. 373, 126 S.W. 432
(1910).
143. Lincoln Trust Co. v. Nathan, 175 Mo. 32, 74 S.W. 1007 (1903).
144. Martin v. Turnbaugh, 153 Mo. 172, 54 S.W. 515 (1899).
145. Burnett v. Johnson, 349 S.W.2d 19, 23 (Mo. 1961). See also Miller v.
St. Louis &cK.C. Ry., 162 Mo. 424, 63 S.W. 85 (1901).
146. Lewis v. Rhodes, 150 Mo. 498, 52 S.W. 11 (1899).
147. Martin v. Turnbaugh, 1539 Mo. 172, 54 S.W. 515 (1899).
148. Hauser v. Murray, 256 Mo. 58, 165 S.W. 376 (1914).
149. 332 Mo. 528, 58 S.W.2d 722 (En Banc 1933).
150. Id. at 538, 58 S.W.2d at 726.
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trial by praying for some unnecessary affirmative equitable relief. If equitable relief is necessary and no adequate remedy at law exists the equitable
issues will then be tried first by the court without a jury. If the equitable
defense fails the remaining legal issues are triable by jury as a matter of
right. 151
The Missouri courts seem to have followed the historical test in this
area. However, in the situation where the defendant's affirmative equitable
relief also entitles him to legal relief, it is likely that a Missouri court would
improperly apply the clean-up doctrine and hold that there was no right
to a juiry trial. An example of this situation is where a defendant claims
breach by plaintiff of the actual contract following reformation. The
correct result, if the contract is reformed, would be to grant a jury trial
of the issue of defendant's claim for damages when either the plaintiff or
the defendant demands it. Historically, the dean-up doctrine would have
been available here to prevent the unnecessary delay in prosecuting two
separate actions. However, this reason for clean-up has disappeared. Furthermore, the clean-up doctrine was discretionary; hence it would not have
been applied prior to merger to deny either party a trial by jury. The
proper solution is for the court to take evidence on the issue of reformation,
decide the issue of reformation, and then convene a jury to determine any
damage issues remaining.
3. Compulsory and Permissive Counterclaims
There is an important distinction between compulsory and permissive
counterclaims. Prior to merger an equitable counterclaim or defense which
arose out of the same transaction as plaintiff's legal action had to be prosecuted separately. After merger, but before the reformed civil procedure
codes, the equitable counterclaim could either be brought against the defendant at law or be the basis of an independent suit.15 2 However, an
equitable counterclaim arising out of a separate transaction could be joined
only in a few instances. 153 Since Missouri's adoption of the new civil procedure code in 1943,154 an equitable claim arising out of the same transaction as the plaintiff's action at law must be joined. 155 All other equitable
and legal counterclaims which arise out of separate transactions may be
joined. 156 That is, what was formerly permissive was made compulsory and
what was formerly prohibited was made permissive. 157 It should be noted
151. Accord, Burnett v. Johnson, 349 S.W.2d 19 (Mo. 1961); Johnson v. McAboy, 350 Mo. 1086, 169 S.W.2d 932 (1943); Hauser v. Murray, 256 Mo. 58, 165
S.W. 376 (1914); Lincoln Trust Co. v. Nathan, 175 Mo. 32, 74 S.W. 1007 (1903);

Martin v. Turnbaugh, 153 Mo. 172, 54 S.W. 515 (1899).
152. C. CLARF,

LAW OF CODE PLEAING 646

(2d ed. 1947).

153. Id. at § 100.
154. Mo. Laws 1943, at 353-401. Now, chapters 506-512, RSMo 1959.
155. Brinkman v. Common School Dist. of Gasconade County, 255 S.W.2d 770
(Mo. En Banc 1953); Davidson v. Mayhew, 169 Mo. 258, 68 S.W. 1031 (1902).
156. A counterclaim of any matured legal or equitable claim against the adverse party which does not arise out of the same transaction as plaintiff's claim
may be presented in the action. §§ 509.060, .420-.440, .460, RSMo 1959.
157. McCoid, Right to a Jury Trial in the Federal Courts,45 IowA L. Rav. 726,
738 (1960).
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that while the introduction of an equitable compulsory counterclaim iequires that all issues be tried without a jury the same rule should not apply
to the permissive equitable counterclaim. This is because the permissive
equitable counterclaim is a separate cause of action which could not have
been used at common law to deny the plaintiff a jury trial because it
could not have been presented in the same suit. Neither should the permissive equitable counterclaim be used to establish a theory of waiver
denying the defendant the right to demand a jury trial on the legal issues of
the plaintiff's claim.'5 8 To do so would defeat the purpose of the new rules
of civil procedure which favor joinder in order to reduce litigation. 1 59
4. Summary
The Missouri courts currently reach the result an application of the
historical test would demand. When the plaintiff submits a legal claim to
which the defendant asserts either an equitable defense or a compulsory
equitable counterclaim necessary to the defendant's full relief and which
would completely defeat the plaintiff's cause of action at law, the equitable
issues must be determined first, thus eliminating the right to a jury trial.
If the equitable issues are determined in the defendant's favor, there is a
total destruction of the plaintiff's claim and neither party can demand a
jury unless the defendant had joined a claim for legal relief with his equitable defense. If the defendant's equitable defense or counterclaim fails then
both parties have the right to demand a trial by jury on the factual issues
presented in the plaintiff's legal demand.' 6 0 If the defendant's equitable
defense is such that it would not completely destroy the plaintiff's cause of
action or if the defense is a matter of concurrent jurisdiction between law
and equity, the case remains triable at law by a jury as a matter of constitutional right.
V. CIVIL ACTIONS

IN WHICH PLAINTIFF PRESENTS AN EQUITABLE

CLAIM AND DEFENDANT PRESENTS A LEGAL COUNTERCLAIM

A. Historical Patterns
Historically, there were three varieties of the situation in which the
plaintiff presented an equitable claim and the defendant possessed a legal
claim against the plaintiff. The first arose when the plaintiff presented an
equitable claim seeking actual or substantive relief and the defendant's
legal claim arose from the same transaction. For example, should the
plaintiff sue for foreclosure of a mechanic's lien on real property, the defendant might contest the foreclosure and bring a legal claim for damages
arising out of the plaintiff's alleged faulty construction work done on the
property under the contract. 61 In such a case the defendant could choose
158. In New York the problem is specifically provided for by statute. N.Y. Civ.
PRnc. Acr § 4102 (c) (McKinney 1963).
159. C. CLARK, supra note 152.
160. E.g., Axley v. Hammock, 185 Ark. 939, 50 S.W.2d 608 (1932); Blair v.
Payer, 63 Ohio App. 29, 24 N.E.2d 965 (1939); Coleman v. Coleman, 208 S.C. 103,
37 S.E.2d 308 (1946).
161. Distefano v. Hall, 218 Cal. App. 2d 657, 32 Cal. Rptr. 770 (1968).
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either to submit his legal claim for damages as a defense in the equity
sUit162 or to bring a separate suit at law.163 Since the clean-up doctrine did
not require the defendant to present his legal claim in the equity action,
an adverse decree in equity would not operate as res judicata to bar a
subsequent legal action. Normally if the defendant chose to assert his legal
claim in a separate action at law, his chances of losing the equity suit would
be increased. Also, since the equity suit would bind the defendant in a
later suit at law as to common issues necessarily decided, 164 there could only
be a jury trial in the law action to the extent collateral estoppel did not
operate to bar relitigation of these common issues. Moreover, if the defendant chose to assert his legal claim in equity, there would be no jury
trial as to any issues. This result would be reached either because the defendant would be deemed to have waived a jury trial, 165 or by application
of the clean-up doctrine.166
The second variety arose when the plaintiff was a prospective defendant at law and filed a bill in equity to defeat his opponent's prospective
action. A present day example is the case in which an insurance company
seeks to defeat the beneficiary's recovery on the policy by suing in equity
to cancel the policy on grounds of fraud. Prior to merger the equity
defendant could have used his legal claim for recovery on the policy either
as a defense or as grounds for a separate cause of action at law.' 6 7 Another
example would be where a party to a contract has not only committed a
material breach but also has grounds for rescission of the contract and for
an accounting for profits. Here, the party would sue in equity for rescission
and an accounting and thereby effectively overcome his opponent's legal
claim for damages. 68 Generally, the same procedure would apply in the
above situations as in the first variety. If the defendant presented his legal
claim as a defense, equity would assume jurisdiction by application of the
dean-up doctrine. 169 It should be noted, however, that the chancellor had a
great deal of discretion in retaining jurisdiction over legal issues,' 70 and
where it was clear that the plaintiff's equitable action was merely a result
of a race to the courthouse, equity would decline to hear the case thus
leaving the parties to their remedies at law. 171 Also, the chancellor might,

162. Coleman v. Coleman, 208 S.C. 103, 107, 37 S.E.2d 305, 313 (1946).
163. James, supra note 134, at 682.
164. RFSrATE ENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68, comments j at 305, o at 309 (1942). See
New Jersey Highway Authority v. Renner, 18 N.J. 485, 114 A.2d 555 (1955). See
also McCoid, supra note 157, at 735.
165. McCoid, supra note 157, at 734.
166. I J. POMEROY, EQurrY JURISPRUDENcE § 232 (5th ed. 1941).
167. Bankers Life Co. v. Bennett, 220 Ia. 922, 263 N.W. 44 (1935). See also
Merchants Fire Assur. Corp. v. Watson, 104 Mont. 1, 64 P.2d 617 (1937).
168. McKinley v. Durbin, 231 S.W.2d 286, 290 (St. L. Mo. App. 1950); Supreme
Lodge K.P. v. Dalzell, 205 Mo. App. 207, 223 S.W. 786 (St. L. Ct. App. 1920). See
also Jones Drilling Corp. v. Rotman, 179 N.E.2d 312 (Ind. Ct. App. 1962), rev'd,
245 Ind. 10, 195 N.E.2d 857 (1964).
169. I J. POMEROY, supra note 166, at §§ 261h, 264a, 264b, 269.
170. Chafee, Bills of Peace with Multiple Parties, 45 HAuv. L. REv. 1297, 132526, (1932).
171. I J. STORY, COMMENTAMES ON EQurrY JURISPRUDENCE § 73 (5th ed. 1849).
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in his discretion, deem it proper to call an advisory jury.'7 2 If instead the

defendant chose to pursue his claim in a separate action at law he would
not be barred by an adverse decree in equity, although collateral estoppel
would bind him as to common issues of fact necessarily determined in the
equitable proceeding.
The third variety arose when the plaintiff filed a claim in equity and
the defendant had a legal claim which arose out of a totally unrelated transaction. In this case, prior to merger, there had to be two actions, one in
equity and one at law. 173 The clean-up doctrine had no application because
equitable jurisdiction extended only to incidental legal relief and separate
causes of action were not incidental to each other.
B. Present Missouri Law
1. Plaintiff Seeks Substantive Equitable Relief
In McKinley v. Durbin174 plaintiff presented an equitable claim for
substantive relief and defendant presented a legal counterclaim. Plaintiff
had obtained sales contracts for defendant and brought an action for an
accounting for commissions due. Defendant denied plaintiff's allegations
and asserted a legal counterclaim for damages, alleging that the plaintiff
had wrongfully and falsely represented defendant's product to customers.
Defendant's demand for a jury trial was denied. The case was assigned to a
referee who found for plaintiff on both issues. Defendant appealed claiming
that the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter a judgment on a legal
issue in the absence of a finding that plaintiff was entitled to equitable
relief. In affirming, the St. Louis Court of Appeals stated that an equitable
17 5
right was involved and that the action of the trial court was correct.
The court pointed out that even if all the issues had been legal, under
Missouri law, the case would have required assignment to a referee because
of the long account involved.' 7 6 The court stated:
where there is a long and involved account requiring a reference
under . . . [section 515.020, RSMo 1959] . . . the distinction
between legal and equitable jurisdiction has about disappeared .... [Defendant's counterclaim in tort for damages] states
an action ex delicto, not of itself subject to compulsory reference,
but as it is here pleaded it is incident to the account sued on and
in such a case77it is the petition which determines the character
of the action.
The court further said that no right of defendant had been lost or abridged
because the suit had been designated as equitable. The decision is most
172. E. DANIELL, PLEADING AND PRACTICE OF THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY
1080 (4th ed. 1871).
173. James, supra note 134, at 681.
174. 231 S.W.2d 286, 290 (St. L. Mo. App. 1950); accord, Crenshaw v. Looker,
185 Mo. 375, 84 S.W. 885 (1904).
175. Krummenacher v. Western Auto Supply Co., 358 Mo. 757, 217 S.W.2d
473 (En Banc 1949).
176. § 515.020 (1), RSMo 1959. See cases cited note 8 supra.
177. McKinley v. Durbin, 231 S.W.2d 286, 290 (St. L. Mo. App. 1950).
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unfortunate 17s in two respects. First, the nature and adequacy of the
remedy should be controlling, rather than mere pleadings; in other words,
substance should control rather than form.' 7 9 Second, the court failed to
recognize that the problem could have been solved by allowing the referee
to decide the matters concerning the long account and then calling a jury
to determine defendant's legal counterclaim. Because of this "oversight" it
would seem that defendant has been denied his constitutional right to trial
by jury' 8 0 on those issues presented in his counterclaim which were not
necessarily determinable in an examination of the long accounts.' 8 ' Historically defendant could have either submitted his claim for legal damages in
the plaintiff's equity bill or initiated an action at law.' 8 2 Defendant in
McKinley v. Durbin did not have this choice because of the compulsory
counterclaim rule. 8 3 It would seem, however, that the existence of the
choice prior to merger would require the trial court to honor defendant's
demand for a jury trial in such a situation today.' 8 4 In failing to recognize
this fact, McKinley v. Durbin constricts the right to trial by jury and disregards the constitutional mandate.' 8 5
The Missouri position is further evidenced by the holding in Spaque
v. Carroll'8 6 in which plaintiff sued for specific performance of a contract
to convey real estate. Defendant prayed for cancellation of the contract for
want of consideration. On appeal defendant claimed that he had been
denied his right to a jury trial. There were, however, two valid reasons why
no right to a jury trial existed: defendant had not claimed the right at trial
and defendant's remedy was not legal in nature. The court recognized the
first ground for denial of a jury trial but failed to recognize the second.
Instead, it emphasized the fact that plaintiff's suit for specific performance
was a suit in equity and stated that:
no answer filed therein can change it from the equity side of the
court ....
[T]he petition is one in equity, and the status of the
case cannot be changed by the answer. We have universally ruled
that if the petition states an action at law, the case is converted
into an action in equity by the filing of an equitable answer. So
that it may be said that if either of the pleadings [petition or
answer] sound in equity, no jury trial can be peremptorily
demanded.18 7
178. Justice Story might have been astounded by such language. I J. STORY,
supra note 171, at §§ 72, 73.
179. Babcock v. Rieger, 332 Mo. 528, 58 S.W.2d 722 (En Banc 1933).
180. Mo. CONST. art. I, § 22a.
181. New Jersey Highway Authority v. Reimer, 18 N.J. 485, 114 A.2d 555
(1955).
182. See notes 160 and 161 supra.

183. Cases cited note 155 supra.
184. Distefano v. Hall, 218 Cal. App. 2d 657, 32 Cal. Rptr. 770 (Dist Ct. App.
1963). Accord, Connell v. Bowes, 19 Cal. 2d 870, 123 P.2d 456 (1942). Contra,
Butler Bros. Dev. Co. v. Butler, 111 Mont. 329, 108 P.2d 1041 (1941).
185. Compare Cooper v. Cook, 347 Mo. 528, 148 S.W.2d 512 (1941) with Field
v. Oliver, 43 Mo. 200 (1869). But see Connell v. Bowes, 19 Cal. 2d 870, 123 P.2d
456 (1942).

186. 188 SW. 63 (Mo. 1916).
187. Id. at 65.
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It is this type of language which arguably leads the law in the wrong
direction. Once again the court's underlying theory is that the power of
equity to attach jurisdiction to clean up all issues is mandatory rather than
discretionary. This approach ignores the fact that since merger, a court
can sit in judgment of a single case both as a court of law and as a court
of equity. It also fails to recognize that the defendant historically could
have chosen between submitting his legal claim as a defense to the suit in
equity and initiating a new cause of action at law in which he could
demand a jury trial. 8 8
The New Jersey courts have taken the proper position on this issue.
89
plaintiff sued for specific
In New Jersey Highway Authority v. Riemer,1
performance of an agreement to convey real estate. Defendant counterclaimed for damages alleging that plaintiff had wrongfully prevented the
removal of her house from the land. The Supreme Court of New Jersey
affirmed this procedure followed by the trial court:
The pre-trial order set forth that there were equitable as well
as legal issues involved and "that all equitable issues arising out
of the complaint, the defense and counterclaim will be tried by
the court; all law issues will be tried by a jury .... The theory of
the trial of this case was that we first try the equity case. If the
plaintiff succeeds on the equity case there would be no necessity for
the law case. We take one step at a time."' 190
This procedure and rationale should be followed in Missouri. The equitable issues of plaintiff's claim, along with any defenses to that claim, should
be tried by the court. As for the introduction of evidence, Missouri trial
courts could impanel a jury at the beginning of the trial to avoid duplication of evidence. Instructions to the jury would be limited to those issues
not previously determined by the court in its equitable decree. 1 9' The
equity decree and the law verdict would then be merged into one final
10 2
judgment.
188. Supreme Lodge K.P. v. Dalzell, 205 Mo. App. 207, 222, 223 S.W. 786, 789
(St. L. Ct. App. 1920). See generally Butler Bros. Dev. Co. v. Butler, 111 Mont. 329,
108 P.2d 1041 (1941); Schreiner v. Witte, 143 Neb. 109, 8 N.W.2d 831 (1943).
189. 18 N.J. 485, 114 A.2d 555 (1955). The 1947 constitution provided for
merger of law and equity in New Jersey. N.J. CoNsT.art. 6, § 3.
190. New Jersey Highway Authority v. Riemer, 18 N.J. 485, 489-90, 114 A.2d
555, 557 (1955).
191. New Jersey Highway Authority v. Riemer, 18 N.J. 485, 114 A.2d 555 (1955).
The court indicated that a determination of equitable issues in favor of the plaintiff
will in some instances preclude the defendant's legal recovery where such determination decides an issue vital to the defendant's counterclaim.
192. This exact procedure was followed in Distefano v. Hall, 218 Cal. App. 2d
675, 32 Cal. Rptr. 770 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963). There plaintiff sued in equity to
foreclose a mechanic's lien on real property. Defendant answered with a general
denial and set up a legal counterclaim for damages caused by defective construction work done on the property in question. Upon defendant's demand the trial
court convened a jury and presented the legal issues to it. On appeal the First
District Court of Appeals stated that
even though the case involves equitable principles, if it is one where the
common law courts could and would grant relief, the right to trial by jury
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol35/iss1/9
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2. Plaintiff Is a Prospective Defendant at Law
In the situation where the plaintiff seeks equitable relief primarily to
defeat the defendant's legal cause of action, the equity court, as it did
prior to merger, should entertain the plaintiff's cause only if in its discretion' 93 the harm in leaving the plaintiff to his remedy at law' 94 would
be greater than the harm to the defendant if he loses the opportunity to a
trial by jury.19 5 Once the plaintiff's equitable claims have been determined
and it is clear that they do not preclude recovery by the defendant, any
legal issues presented by the defendant's counterclaim which have not already been disposed of should be submitted to a jury. Although no Missouri
cases have been found, a representative case in this area is Bankers Life Co.
v. Bennett,19 6 an Iowa case in which the plaintiff insurer sued to cancel a
policy of life insurance on the grounds of fraudulent procurement. Defendant beneficiary counterclaimed for the full amount of the policy. Defendant claimed that plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law and moved
to transfer the case to the law docket. The trial court sustained this motion,
thus enabling defendant to demand a jury trial. In affirming, the Supreme
Court of Iowa stated:
[t]o sustain the position of the [plaintiff insurance company]
herein would be to sanction a practice by which the plaintiff in
every action upon an insurance policy, or, indeed, upon every
simple matter of contract, may be deprived of his constitutional
right to have his cause submitted to a jury. 97
In the situation where there is some substantial equitable interest in the
plaintiff's claim (such as the running of the incontestability period before
the opposing party brings his legal claim for recovery) the equity court
could choose to entertain the case.198
3. Plaintiff's Equitable Claim Is Totally Unrelated to
the Defendant's Legal Counterclaim
In the situation where the plaintiff presents an equitable claim and
the defendant presents a permissive' 99 legal counterclaim, the right to trial
by jury should be allowed for all the legal issues presented in the counteris preserved ....
[A] party is entitled to a jury trial on the legal issues
of fact raised by a cross complaint....
218 Cal. App. 2d 657, 662 n. 6, 32 Cal. Rptr. 770, 773 n. 6 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
This represents an application of the historical test and should be followed in
Missouri. Compare CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 7 with Mo. CoNsr. art. I, § 22 (a).
193. I J. STORY, supra note 171; Chafee, supra note 170.
194. Professor James indicates that if the insured were allowed to delay, the
harm to the insurer would be the running of the incontestability period. James,
Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 683 (1963).
195. Prior to Beacon Theatres Inc., v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959), the federal courts had this same discretion in equity.
196. 220 Iowa 922, 263 N.W. 44 (1935).
197. Id. at 925, 263 N.W. at 45. See also Merchants Fire Assur. Corp. v. Watson,

104 Mont. 1, 64 P.2d 617 (1937).
198. See note 194 supra.

199. Stoops v. Stoops, 363 Mo. 1075, 256 S.W.2d 799 (1953); § 509.060, RSMo

1959.
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claim. 200 Historically, there would have been two separate actions, one in
equity and the other at law. Moreover, to hold that the defendant waives
his right to trial by jury when he presents his legal counterclaim would
discourage defendants from joining permissive counterclaims. 20 1 Furthermore, the theory that equity has the power to grant incidental legal relief
is not applicable because a permissive counterclaim cannot be considered
into being in
incidental relief. Since the permissive counterclaim rule came
202
1943, equity has never exerted jurisdiction in this area.
VI. CIVIL ACTIONS FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT.

Preventive or anticiptory actions have been used in equity for a considerable period of time. 20 3 Such actions were founded on the inherent
power of the equity court 204 and were employed at the discretion of the
chancellor.205 The chancellor exercised his discretion only where necessary
to protect the parties' rights.
In the 1920's many states began to adopt uniform statutory rules for
declaratory judgment action. 206 At the present time thirty-eight states have
adopted such provisions. 2 07 Missouri adopted these laws in 1985.208 Despite
2 09
the fact that the declaratory judgments originated in the court of equity,
under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, it is considered neither
equitable nor legal in nature.2 10 Apparently, the framers of the Uniform
Act took a neutral position toward jury trial, intending neither to expand
nor to contract the right. 211 This means that the same rules are applicable
in this area as in any other in which legal or equitable issues, or both, are
21 2
presented.
200. Jones Drilling Corp. v. Rotman, 179 N.E.2d 312 (Ind. Ct. App. 1962),

rev'd, 245 Ind. 10, 195 N.E.2d 857 (1964). See Fish v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer-

ica, 255 Ind. 448, 75 N.E.2d 57 (1957).
201. McCoid, supra note 157, at 736.
Professor McCoid suggests that:
[I]f the counterclaim is permissive, its assertion by defendant is a complete waiver of jury trial thereon by him, and his demand should not be
allowed if opposed by plaintiff.
This statement was made concerning the rule followed in the federal courts. Judge
Clark criticizes this waiver rule; C. CLARK, supra note 152, at § 17. It is an unfortunate rule for the defendant for if he wishes a jury trial he must gamble that his
counterclaim is permissive in nature, present it as the basis of a separate action at
law, and hope it will not be barred by the doctrine of res judicata. See Brinkmann
v. Common School Dist. of Gasconade County, 255 S.W.2d 770 (Mo. En Banc 1953).
202. § 509.060, RSMo 1959. See generally James, supra note 194, at 684.
203.

I W.

ANDERSON,

ACTIONS

FOR

DECLARATORY

JUDGMENTS

§ 1 (2d ed. 1951).

204. Id. at 4-11.
205. James, supra note 194, at 685. See § 527.060, RSMo 1959.
206. See generally W. ANDERSON, supra note 203, at § 214.
207. UNxrOFu DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT, 9 A.U.L.A. 1 (1965).
208. Mo. LAws 1935, at 218, §§ 1-15. Now §§ 527.010-.140- RSMo 1959.
209. W. ANDERSON, supra note 203, at 459.
210. Section 527.090, RSMo 1959 provides:
When a proceeding under sections 527.010 to 527.140 involves the deter.
mination of an issue of fact, such issue may be tried and determined in
the same manner as issues of fact are tried and determined in other dvil
actions in the court in which the proceeding is pending.
211. James, supra note 194, at 685-86.
212. See United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Terte, 351 Mo. 1089, 176 S.W.2d (En
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VII. CONCLUSION

In analyzing the difference between law and equity Professor Holdsworth has commented:
The distinction between the strict rule of law and modification of that law on equitable or moral grounds is a distinction
well known to many systems of law; and it was familiar to English
lawyers from the twelfth century onward. It is not therefore the
distinction between law and equity which is peculiar to English
law. What is peculiar is the vesting of the administration of law
and equity in two quite separate tribunals. The result has been a
sharpness
and a permanence which it possesses in no other legal
system. 21 3
After examining one of the last major distinctions between law and equity,
the right to trial by jury, one might reasonably conclude that one result of
the merger of these two systems is an entanglement of confusion and complexity.21 4 The situation is not irredeemable, however, and if the cases
21 5
most
which arise are analyzed in the manner set out in this comment,
can be classified an examined with relative ease. In those cases which are
counterparts of formerly legal claims, a constitutional right to trial by jury
exists. Conversely, in those cases which are counterparts of former equitable
claims neither party has a right to trial by jury. Concerning the three situations in which both legal and equitable claims have been involved (IV, V,
and VI above), the clean-up doctrine has been applied to deny trial by
jury on the legal issues presented.
The application of the clean-up doctrine to deny trial by jury in the
situation in which both legal and equitable claims are presented is theoretically improper. Such an application violates the mandate of the Missouri
Constitution article I, section 22 (a) because it reaches a result contrary to
that required by the historical test. Arguably the clean-up doctrine is altogether inapplicable because merger destroyed all but perhaps a very limited
need for the rule. Prior to merger, the doctrine was developed and applied
to relieve parties from the evils of a separate system of law and equity.
Today, there is no need for such relief because one court is now given the
power once held separately by the chancellor and the law court. However,
even if it is assumed that a modern need for the clean-up doctrine exists,
as originally developed, it was never applied in such an arbitrary manner
as to result in the denial of a trial by jury. Unfortunately, these views
have not been accepted in Missouri. It is submitted that as a result many
Missouri litigants have been denied their fundamental right to trial by jury.
THos JAN O'NEIL

Banc 1948); Crollard v. Northern Life Ins. Co., 240 Mo. App. 355, 200 S.W.2d
375 (K.C. Ct. App. 1947).
213. I. W. HIoLDswoRTH, A HISTORY or ENGLISH LAW 446 (1931).
214. James, supra note 194, at 690-93 where Professor James discussed alternative tests for determining when right to jury trial should exist. He concluded that
the historical-constitutional test is as workable and practical as any other proposal.
215. Ibid.
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